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ABSTRACT 
 
Nearly fifteen years after the establishment of the first Islamic bank Indonesia, a new law was 
introduced in 2006 that in effect empowers the Religious Court in the country to oversee, hear 
and decide on disputes relating to matters of Islamic finance and Islamic economics. In its way to 
the enactment, the Parliament preferred the word „Islamic economics‟ than the word „Islamic 
banking‟ which was initially put in the draft law. This law (which amends the older 1989 Act on 
the Religious Court) has resulted in two things: first, depriving the power of conventional courts 
over disputes relating to Islamic economics activities and, secondly, expanding the jurisdiction of 
a considerably inferior Religious Court that was restricted on areas of Muslim matrimonial and 
personal property matters. While many applauded the passing of this new law, the Law No. 3 of 
2006 may have at the same time raised the eye-brows of many in the industry and campuses. 
When Islamic banking professionals and scholars are awaiting a more fundamental and 
substantive law on Islamic banking, the passing of 2006 law is rather an unexpected gift.  
 
This regulatory reform had in many ways upgraded the Religious Court in Indonesia; this is what 
makes everyone happy. But this reform surely requires those in legal fraternity (judges, attorneys, 
legal practitioners and academia) to prepare lots of things in order to make the law works. Issues 
such as human resource development and capacity building, harmonization of legal and 
regulatory frameworks especially in the dispute resolution matters, jurisprudential development 
and many more will need to be identified and responded in quick and professional fashion. 
Otherwise, the 2006 legal reform may become like a posh car which is left untouched in a garage. 
With a strong view that this „unexpected gift‟ should not be wasted, this paper seeks to explore 
and investigate those potential issues and challenges resulting from the enactment of this law 
(Law No. 3 of 2006). In addition to this Court, an alternative institution for resolution of Islamic 
banking and finance disputes such as BASYARNAS (National SharÊÑah Arbitration Body) is 
also established. In order to achieve its objective, this paper employs an analytical and 
comparative studies as well as observing through some empirical case studies. This paper 
hypothesizes that this identification would help Religious Courts and BASYARNAS uphold an 
effective reform to better improve the Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia. 
 
 
Keywords: Islamic banking, Islamic finance, dispute resolution, legal reform, Religious Court,    
BASYARNAS 
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1. Introduction  
 
After a long journey, the wish of the Muslims in Indonesia to have a bank which operates 
based on Islamic principles was finally achieved in 1992 with the establishment of Bank 
Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), established based on Law No. 7 of 1992 on Banking which 
provides opportunity for the development of interest-free banking.
1
  
 
In order to provide a stronger legal foundation for Islamic banking operations, the Law 
No. 7 of 1992 was further amended in 1998 by Law No. 10 of 1998. A notable change 
brought about by this law was the permission it gave to the conventional banks to open 
Islamic banking units. However, these laws appeared inadequate for the regulation of 
Islamic banking; thus in 2008 a Law No. 21 of 2008 on Islamic Banking was enacted and 
passed by the Indonesian Parliament. This law provided better legal basis for the 
development of Islamic banking in Indonesia. Since that time, the growth of Islamic 
banking in Indonesia has been developing rapidly. Currently, the number of banks 
conducting business activities based on sharÊÑah principles are represented by 11 
Islamic commercial banks, 23 Islamic business units and 150 Islamic rural banks and the 
total number of offices was 1,763 spreading over thirty-two provinces.
2
 
 
In order to maintain the pace of this fast development, legal support is necessary, 
covering not only the functioning but also the resolution of disputes which might arise 
between banks, customers and policyholders. Like in any other business, disputes in 
Islamic banking are inevitable. As Islamic banking is sharÊÑah based, hence their 
disputes resolution techniques must also be based Islamic principles.  
 
In Indonesia, prior to 2006, the resolution of Islamic banking disputes was under the 
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. A Religious Court, at that time, had no authority to settle 
such disputes, as its jurisdiction was confined to personal matters only such as marriage, 
inheritance, wassiyyah (testament), hiba (gifts), sadaqah (alms), zakat (tithe), and waqf.
3
 
However, after Law No. 7 of 1989 relating to Religious Court was amended by the Law 
No. 3 of 2006, significant changes were brought in by extending the jurisdiction of the 
Religious Court to cover Islamic economic matters, including Islamic banking. This 
expansion has arguably enhanced the position and authority of the Religious Court as a 
dispute resolution institution within the Indonesian legal system. Later on in 2008, the 
jurisdiction of Religious Court to settle Islamic banking disputes was further consolidated 
in section 55 (1) of Law No. 21 of 2008.
4
  
 
                                                 
*The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge for the valuable contribution and revision provided by 
Prof. Dr. Syed Khalid Rashid in preparing this paper. 
1
This law implicitly allowed a bank to operate based on profit-sharing.  However, the expression related to 
Islamic bank was not clearly mentioned in this law, as it only used the expression “profit sharing” as a 
legal provision for the operational basis of an Islamic bank. The term of profit sharing is only mentioned 
in a few sections, namely in section. 1(12), section 6(m) and section 13(o). 
2
 Islamic Banking Statistics of Bank Indonesia, March 2011. It can be accessed on www.bi.go.id.  
3
 See, section 49 of Law No. 7 of 1989 concerning Religious Court. 
4
 According to this section, it is stated that the “settlement of disputes of SharÊÑah (Islamic) Banking is 
conducted by a court in the Religious court”. 
3 
 
Besides the Religious Court, an alternative institution which has the authority to resolve 
Islamic banking and finance disputes is the National Shari’ah Arbitration Body (Badan 
Arbitrase Shari’ah Nasional – or „BASYARNAS‟). This Islamic arbitration body in 
Indonesia was established in 1993 by the initiative of the influential Indonesian Ulama 
Council (MUI) with the objective of resolving muamalat disputes. 
 
This paper attempts to discuss the role of the aforementioned institutions in resolving 
Islamic banking disputes and also to examine the effectiveness of those institutions in 
resolving such disputes.  
 
 
2. Islamic Banking Dispute in the Religious Court  
 
At its roots, Indonesian legal system is pluralistic. It has adopted Dutch civil law and also 
changes in it brought by the influx of time.
5
 In addition, it has also been influenced by the 
customary (adat) law and Islamic law. These systems exist in tandem and are developing. 
However, in recent years, the Indonesian legal system has also been affected by the 
common law system, particularly in commercial and business matters.
6
 
 
Indonesian judicial system has four types of courts: General Court, Religious Court, 
Military Court and State Administrative Court. These are supervised by the Supreme 
Court which is as the highest judicial institution. Indonesian courts do not apply the 
principle of precedent which is commonly found in common law jurisdictions. With 
regard to the Religious Court, it is a special kind of judicial institution for settling 
sharÊÑah-related disputes. It is regulated by Law No. 50 of 2009 concerning the Second 
Amendment on Law No. 7 of 1989 on Religious Court.
7
 
 
The hierarchy of the Religious Court can be divided into two levels i.e., the Religious 
Court as the court of first instance and the Religious High Court as the second appellate 
court. The Religious Court of first instance is a court which examines and decides any 
petition or lawsuit at the lowest level. In other words, it acts as a court which 
accommodates and adjudicates at the first instance all cases filed therein seeking justice. 
A case cannot be brought directly to the Religious High Court. This court is located in the 
capital city of called Kabupaten or Kota. However, the Religious High Court, as an 
appellate court, acts and authorizes the re-examination of decisions of Religious Court at 
the first instance, if the disputing parties file an appeal. In other words, in the event one or 
both parties to the dispute are unsatisfied with the decision of the Religious Court, they 
may file an appeal against such decision in the Religious High Court to review the case. 
Therefore, all decisions of the Religious Court can be appealed to and be reviewed by the 
Religious High Court. As such, the decision of the Religious Court may be cancelled, 
                                                 
5Karen Mills, “Indonesia”, in Dispute Resolution in Asia, edited by Michael Pryles (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), 155. 
6
Ibid. See also, Benny S. Tabalujan, “Features - The Indonesian Legal System: An Overview”, <http: 
//www.indobizlaw.com/forms/IDLegalOverview.pdf.> (accessed May 24, 2010)  
7
The Law No. 50 of 2009 concerning the Second Amendment on Law No. 7 of 1989 concerning Religious 
Court was enacted on October 29, 2009. Prior to that, the Law No. 7 of 1989 was amended by Law No. 3 of 
2006. However, in this second amendment, there are no significant changes, particularly in an absolute 
competence of the Religious Court.  
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revised and re-affirmed by the Religious High Court.
8
 The position of this court is located 
in the capital city of each province. In addition, the decision of the Religious High Court 
may be appealed to the Supreme Court which can also order review if, for instance, new 
evidence is found justifying a fresh hearing.
 
 
 
 
3. The Jurisdiction of the Religious Court: Development and Views 
 
The jurisdiction of the Religious Court is either relative or absolute. The relative 
jurisdiction is closely related to the local law, i.e. based on local legislations.
9
 The 
absolute jurisdiction, on the other hand, is based on the type of case and level of court.
10
 
The absolute jurisdiction of the Religious Court has experienced a significant change 
with the coming of Law No. 3 of 2006. It saw an expansion to cover the matters not only 
confined to the areas of marriage, inheritance, testament, grant, wakaf and sadaqah 
(alms), but also to resolve disputes regarding Islamic economics.  
 
However this development is not without resistance. To the critics, the Religious Court 
does not have enough experience in resolving Islamic economic matters. It is argued 
here, that while the worry is understandable, it is wrong to underestimate the capability of 
the Religious Court in resolving Islamic banking disputes. This paper argues that this new 
development is an appropriate step that will enable the harmonization of Islamic 
principles and modern dispute settlement methods. Judges of Religious Court are 
arguably Muslims who have good knowledge of Islamic law.
11
 
 
It is worthy to note that during 2006-2010, out of 3,390 judges in Religious Court,
12
 more 
than 500 have enrolled in Masters and PhD programmes in the field of business law and 
Islamic economics and this number may visibly increase in the future. In addition, a 
variety of seminars and training in Islamic economics have also been conducted by the 
Supreme Court in order to increase the understanding of the Religious Court judges. The 
incapability of the Religious Court in handling Islamic economy matters, including 
Islamic banking, is therefore ill-founded.
13
  
 
In addition, it is important to note that the Law No. 3 of 2006 has introduced a new 
principle which is explained in the elucidation of section 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006
14
 
                                                 
8
M. Yahya Harahap, Kedudukan, Kewenangan dan Acara Pengadilan Agama UU No. 7 Tahun 1989, 
(Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2
nd
 ed., 2001), 112-114. 
9
Cik Hasan Bisri, Peradilan Agama di Indonesia, (Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo, 2nd., 1998), 203.  
10
Ibid., 206. 
11Abdul Mannan, “Penyelesaian Sengketa Ekonomi Syariah: Sebuah Kewenangan Baru”, 
<www.badilag.net.> (accessed 9
th
 September 2008), 26.   
12
Profile of Religious Court 2010. www.badilag.net/english  
13
Interview with Wahyu Widiana, Director General of Religious Courts Body, the Supreme Court of 
Indonesia, Jakarta, April 6, 2010. 
14
According to section 49 (i) of Law No. 3 of 2006 “A Religious Court has tasks and authority to examine, 
hear and adjudicate cases at first level among Muslims in the fields of: 1. Marriage, 2. Inheritance, 3. 
Testament, 4. Hibah, 5. Wakaf, 6. Zakat, 7. Infaq, 8. Sadaqah, 9. (i) SharÊÑah (Islamic) economy.” The 
meaning of sharÊÑah (Islamic) economy as provided in the elucidation of this section is “any act or 
business activity which is carried out in accordance with Islamic principles which consists of SharÊÑah 
bank,  ShariÑÉh insurance, SharÊÑah reinsurance, SharÊÑah mutual fund, SharÊÑah bond and Med-term 
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which says that the meaning of „among Muslims‟ is “consisting of a person or a legal 
entity which (may be a non-Muslim or a company having no religion) voluntarily binds 
himself/itself to Islamic law in respect of matters which are under the competence of the 
Religious Court in accordance with the provision of this section.” By virtue of this 
elucidation, it can be understood that the Religious Court has competence in settling 
disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims as long as they voluntarily agree to adopt 
the rules of Islamic principles. Based on the above principle, the issue regarding the 
jurisdiction of the Religious Court with reference to Islamic economy disputes involving 
non-Muslims or legal entity stands resolved.   
 
In 2008, the government of Indonesia issued a new Islamic Banking Law No. 21. This 
law re-emphasized the competence of the Religious Court in resolving Islamic banking 
disputes. It is clearly mentioned in section 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008: 
 
(1) Settlement of Islamic banking disputes is carried out by a court in the 
Religious Court.   
 
(2) In the case that the parties have already agreed to the settlement of disputes 
other than that considered in paragraph (1), the settlement of dispute shall be 
carried out according to the akad (contract) content. 
 
(3) Settlement of disputes as considered in paragraph (2) may not be contrary to 
the Shari’ah principle.        
 
Section 55 (1) above clearly stipulates the competence of the Religious Court in the 
settlement of Islamic banking disputes. However, Paragraph 2 of this section gives a 
chance to disputing parties to choose another forum besides the Religious Court to settle 
their dispute based on their agreement in the contract. The meaning of “the settlement of 
dispute shall be carried according to the akad content” is defined in the elucidation of 
section 55 (2) as: a) Musyawarah (consensus by deliberation), (b) banking mediation, (c) 
through the National SharÊÑah Arbitration Body (BASYARNAS) or other arbitration 
institutions and/or (d) through the court within the General Court/Civil Court.  
 
To provide an alternative mechanism to disputing parties to settle their disputes in 
Islamic banking such as deliberation (musyawarah), mediation and arbitration are 
considered very good way out because through such alternative mechanisms, disputes of 
Islamic banking can be settled in a speedy and friendly manner. However, serious 
problem appears when the Civil Court is also conferred the same authority as the 
Religious Court in the resolution of Islamic banking disputes.  
 
Practitioners of Islamic banking have different opinions in respect of this matter. Dadan 
Mutaqien, in his petition for judicial review regarding the elucidation of section 55 (2) (d) 
of Law No. 21 of 2008 filed in the Constitutional Court, is of the opinion that such 
provision is clearly contrary to the competence of the Religious Court as stipulated in 
 
negotiable paper, SÍarÊ‘ah security market, SharÊÑah financing, SharÊÑah pawnbroker, SharÊÑah 
pension fund financial institution and SharÊÑah business and Shari’ah micro financing institution.” 
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section 49 (i) of Law No. 3 of 2006. Furthermore, he argues that the existence of choice 
of forum in the resolution of Islamic banking disputes, based on section 55 (2) (d) of Law 
No. 21, has proved the inconsistency of lawmakers in formulating the rule of law.
15
 
Similarly Abdul Ghani Abdullah, a judge of the Supreme Court, has also admitted that 
section 55(2) created contradictio in terminis (opposite meaning). On one side, it 
stipulates that disputes of Islamic banking are to be resolved by the Religious Court; on 
the other hand, it also gives a chance to the Civil Court to resolve such disputes. He 
predicts that in the future this problem may create conflict of jurisdiction between the 
Religious Court and the Civil Court. However, he is of the view that the stakeholders of 
Islamic banking should not panic because this problem will be ultimately settled by the 
Supreme Court. In the event that there is a dispute of competence between these two 
judicial institutions, the Supreme Court can issue a decision as to which court is apt to 
handle such matter.
16
      
 
In contrast to the above arguments, Amin Suma is of the opinion that section 55 (2) 
should not be seen as a problem as it does not conflict with the competence of the 
Religious Court. The resolution of Islamic banking disputes through the Civil Court will 
only come in if disputing parties agree to do that in their contract. However, it is 
important to note that although the Civil Court is allowed to handle Islamic banking 
disputes, section 55 (3) strictly stipulates that these disputes should be resolved based on 
Islamic principles. That is to say, the Civil Court could only adjudicate such disputes if it 
agrees to apply Islamic law. Therefore, there is not much to worry; what we do have to 
worry about is when the dispute is referred to the Civil Court but is decided not based on 
Islamic principles.
17
 Rifyal Ka‟bah also has a similar opinion. According to him, section 
55 (2) of Law No. 21 of 2008 was a political product because until then there were still a 
number of people who opposed the settlement of Islamic banking disputes in the 
Religious Court. However, in principle, there is no problem if Islamic banking cases are 
settled in the Civil Court, provided the judges have good knowledge of Islamic law as 
well as Islamic business law and could make decisions based on Islamic principles.
18
  
 
Based on the above arguments, it can be concluded that even though section 55 (2) Law 
No. 21 of 2008 allows the Civil Court to resolve Islamic banking disputes, section 55 (3) 
requires it to apply Islamic principles. It is strictly prohibited to refer to other laws which 
may be contrary to Islamic principles. However, the writer is more inclined to the first 
argument because giving a parallel authority to two courts which have absolutely 
different competence may generate serious problems in the future and uncertainty in the 
legal system. Both the Religious Court and the Civil Court have different competences as 
is clearly stipulated in Law No 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power. They have no 
authority to examine disputes which are beyond their competence.  
 
                                                 
15“Dualisme Penyelesaian Sengketa Perbankan Syariah Dibawa ke MK”, 1st March 2010, 
<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4b8bc050105d5/dualisme-penyelesaian-sengketa-perbankan-
syariah-dibawa-ke-mk> (accessed 25
th
 May 2010). 
16
Ibid. 
17
Interview with Prof. Dr. Amin Suma, SH, MM, Dean Faculty of SyarÊÑah and Law, Islamic University 
of Sharif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, November 18, 2008  
18Interview with Prof. Dr. Rifyal Ka‟bah, Judge of Indonesian Supreme Court, Jakarta, November 20, 2008 
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According to Yahya Harahap, the main objective of the creation of delimitation of court 
competence is to orderly build the implementation of judicial power within court 
environments. Each court must function within their area which has been provided for in 
accordance with the prescribed jurisdiction. This construction will make synchronization, 
legal certainty and provide specific direction for people who want to seek justice in the 
appropriate court in compliance with its jurisdiction.
19
 Therefore, to avoid conflicting 
jurisdiction between Religious Court and Civil Court in resolving Islamic banking 
disputes in the future, the competence given to the Civil Court in resolving Islamic 
banking disputes has to be deleted because such provision is in conflict with the 
competence of the Religious Court as prescribed in Law No. 3 of 2006. Pending a 
legislative correction of this anomaly, the Supreme Court, as the highest judicial 
institution in Indonesia, should determine which court has the jurisdiction in this area.    
 
4. BASYARNAS (National SharÊÑah Arbitration Body) 
BASYARNAS (Badan Arbitrase SharÊÑah Nasional – National SharÊÑah Arbitration 
Body) is the only Islamic arbitration body in Indonesia. It was established on October 21, 
1993 with the initiative of MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia – Indonesian Ulama 
Council).
20
 Actually a desire of Muslims in Indonesia to have a body/institution which 
can resolve civil matters in a fair and quick manner based on musyÉwarah (deliberation) 
has existed for long time. It increasingly received a boost with the establishment of Bank 
Muamalat Indonesia and Islamic Rural Bank.
21
 According to HS. Prodjokusumo, the 
former MUI General Secretary, the idea of the establishment of BAMUI in Indonesia 
could not be separated from the context of social and economic developments of 
Muslims‟ life. This is closely related to the establishment of Bank Muamalat Indonesia, 
Syari‟ah Rural Banks and the planning of the setting up of Islamic Insurance at that 
time.
22
 Like other financial institutions, it has been predicted that the operation of Islamic 
banking and Islamic insurance institution may face various challenges such as disputes 
with their customers. In order to ensure that their activities are in compliance with 
sharÊÑah principles, their dispute should be settled within an appropriate body using 
Islamic principles as guidelines.  
                                                 
19
Harahap, 102. 
20
BASYARNAS previously was known as BAMUI (Badan Arbitrase MuÑÉmalat Indonesia - Indonesian 
MuÑÉmalat Arbitration Body). The establishment of this Islamic arbitration forum was initiated by MUI 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia – Indonesian Ulama Council) based on the decision of Rakernas (Rapat Kerja 
Nasional – National Working Meeting) of MUI on November 24-27, 1992. It has a legal status as a 
Foundation (Yayasan). Furthermore by virtue of a Decree of MUI No: Kep-09/MUI/XII/2003 dated 30 
syawal 1424 H / December 2003, the name of BAMUI was changed to BASYARNAS and its legal entity 
was also changed from Foundation (Yayasan) to a body which comes under MUI and constitutes as one of 
its arms organization. However, it is important to note that although its status now comes under MUI, in 
carrying out its duties and function, it enjoys an autonomous status. See, Ahmad Dimyati, “Sejarah 
Lahirnya BAMUI,” in Arbitrase Islam di Indonesia, edited by Abdul Rahman Saleh at all, (Jakarta: 
BAMUI & Bank Muamalat, 1994), 191. Ahmad Djauhari, Arbitrase Syari’ah di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
BASYARNAS, 2006), 38-44.  
21
Speech of Abdul Rahman Saleh in Badan Arbitrase Muamalat Indonesia, (Jakarta: BAMUI, 1994), 1. 
22
HS. Prodjokusumo, in Badan Arbitrase Muamalat Indonesia, (Jakarta:  Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1993), 
3, cited in Ahmad Dimyati, 192. 
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In relation to this, the BASYARNAS is considered suitable forum for the resolution of 
Islamic banking and finance disputes because its main objective is to provide a quick and 
fair resolution, based on sharÊÑah principles, in matters of muamalat disputes arising in 
the field of trade, commerce, financial industry, service, etc.
23
  
 
Based on the explanation above we can see that BASYARNAS, as one of the recognized 
legal bodies in Indonesia, stands independently in undertaking its duty. It is quite useful 
for the resolution of Islamic banking and finance disputes. Non-Muslims may also refer 
their disputes to BASYARNAS which is obliged to accept and solve their disputes fairly 
and in equitable manner without exception as long as they are convinced of its credibility 
and capability.  
  
The procedures of BASYARNAS for the resolution of disputes are clearly mentioned in 
the Procedural Rules, which are considered as guidelines to be followed by the arbitrators 
and parties to a dispute. If need be, the substance of these Rules can be revised for 
improvement and perfection. With regard to the jurisdiction of BASYARNAS, section 1 
of its Procedural Rules clearly says: 
 
a. Resolving in fairly and quickly a muÑÉmalat / civil dispute arising in trade, 
finance, industry, services and others in which pursuant to law and regulation 
are fully controlled by the disputing parties, and the parties agree in writing 
to submit a resolution to BASYARNAS in accordance with the Procedural 
Rules of BASYARNAS.  
 
b. Giving a binding opinion at the request of the parties without any dispute 
about an issue in an agreement. 
    
From the above the role of BASYARNAS in the Indonesian legal system is found to be 
well recognized. It plays an important position where its jurisdiction covers muÑÉmalat 
disputes in respect of trade, industry, finance, service, etc. When parties to the dispute 
agree to settle their dispute through BASYARNAS, they must make an agreement in 
writing indicating that they agree to do so and also follow its Procedural Rules.     
 
5. Dispute Resolution in Practice 
5.1. Cases in the Religious Court 
Since the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2006 concerning the Religious Court in 2006 and up 
to now, only nine cases of Islamic banking disputes have reached the Religious Court,
24
 
                                                 
23
A. Rahmat Rosyadi and Ngatino, Arbitrase dalam Perspektif Islam dan Hukum Positif, (Bandung: PT. 
Citra Aditya Bakti,), 55-56.    
24
Those cases among others are as follows: are: 1) No: 1047/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Pbg, 2) No:  
1044/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Pbg, 3) No: 1045/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Pbg, 4) No: 1046/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Pbg, 5) No: 
1165/Pdt.G/2010/PA.Pbg, 6) No: 0518/Pdt.G/2011/PA.Pbg, 7) No: 284/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Bkt, 8) No: 
01/Pdt.G/Eks/07/PA. Bkt, 9) No: 02/Pdt.G/Eks/08/PA.Bkt  
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and out of these, two cases are brought to the Supreme Court for cassation and case 
review.
25
  
 
 
Case 1: H. Effendi bin Rajab & Drs. Fitri Effendi binti Munir v Bank Bukopin Syariah & 
Ors 
 
The earliest case pertaining to Islamic banking received by the Religious Court since the 
enactment of Law No. 3 of 2006 concerning the Religious Court in 2006 is the case No: 
284/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Bkt. This case was decided by the Religious Court of Bukittinggi in 
respect of „Akad Murabahah‟ carried out by H. Effendi bin Rajab & Drs. Fitri Effendi 
binti Munir v Bank Bukopin Syariah & Ors, both as the plaintiffs and defendant 
respectively.  
 
Prior to this case decided in 2004 by the Religious Court, a defendant (at that time, as a 
plaintiff) filed a lawsuit against the plaintiffs (at that time as defendants) at a District 
Court (Pengadilan Negeri) in Bukittinggi.
26
 The plaintiffs defaulted to pay an installment 
as agreed in the murabahah contract. The District Court of Bukittingi accepted a lawsuit 
of defendant and it subsequently applied for an auction at the District Court. By virtue of 
the Determination of Chief of District Court of Bukittinggi No: 03/PDT.EKS/2006/PN-
BT dated July 4, 2006, the District Court issued an order to execute auction towards the 
plaintiffs‟ collateral.    
 
However, along with the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2006 which extended the jurisdiction 
of the Religious Court in hearing and adjudicating cases of Islamic economic including 
Islamic banking, the customers then filed a lawsuit against PT. Bank Bukopin Shari‟ah to 
the Religious Court of Bukittinggi. The main issue raised by the plaintiffs in their lawsuit 
was related to the validity of murabahah contract. The plaintiffs just realized that a 
murabahah contract which they carried out with the defendant (Bank Bukopin Shari‟ah) 
was invalid and contrary to shari’ah principles.  
 
In the murabahah contract it was mentioned that the defendant seemed to have purchased 
the goods needed by plaintiffs amounting to Rp500 million and then seemed to have sold 
such goods to the plaintiffs at a price of Rp794.816.460 by taking a profit of 
Rp294.816.460. However, in practice, no goods were bought and sold by the defendant to 
the plaintiffs.
27
 Similarly, this method got repeated in the second murabahah contract 
also where the defendant seemed to have bought goods ordered by the plaintiffs in the 
amount of Rp350.000.000 and sold the goods to the plaintiffs at the price of 
Rp581.230.044. In this second murabahah contract, the defendant obtained a profit of 
Rp231.230.044.
28
 Therefore a liability of the plaintiffs was to pay Rp1.376.046.504, 
based on the two murabahah contracts.  
 
                                                 
25
Case No: 284/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Bkt and case No: 1047/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Pbg. These two cases will be 
discussed in detailed. 
26
Case Registration No:  No: 08/PDT.BTH/2004/PN-BT. 
27
See a copy of decision No: 284/Pdt. G/2006 PA. BKT, 5. 
28
Ibid., 8-9. 
10 
 
After carefully examining the practice of such murabahah contracts, the plaintiffs 
realized that it was absolutely invalid and contrary to sharÊÑah principles because no 
real goods were bought or sold by the defendant to the plaintiffs. In the Islamic law 
perspective, one of the important requirements that should be fulfilled in the murabahah 
contract is that the goods should actually be sold. Because these murabahah contracts 
contained legal defects, they should be deemed as void. In addition, their relationship 
with defendant must also be considered as a lending and borrowing relationship with 
immovable property as collateral and payment that had been paid in installment by the 
plaintiffs to the defendant must also be regarded as a loan payment because providing a 
profit or an additional payment outside the principal loan amount is firmly prohibited and 
unjustified in sharÊÑah.  
 
Furthermore, the plaintiff also argued that the District Court of Bukittingi did not have 
the authority to settle Islamic banking dispute since the time of the enactment of Law No. 
3 of 2006, when the jurisdiction to settle Islamic banking disputes had been handed over 
to the Religious Court. As a result, the execution of the auction as mentioned above was 
also unacceptable.
29
 
 
However, the defendant refuted the plaintiffs‟ arguments mainly on the ground that the 
Religious Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the case because it had been 
decided by the District Court of Bukittinggi and had permanent legal force with case No: 
08/PDT.BTH/2004/PN.BT.
30
  
 
Based on the arguments given by both the plaintiffs and defendant, the panel judges, in 
their consideration, countered the defendant‟s argument and said that they have 
jurisdiction to hear, investigate and decide the case based on the provision of section 49 
Law No. 3 of 2006. Furthermore, the object of lawsuit submitted to the Religious Court 
and Civil Court was dissimilar. The object of lawsuit submitted to the Religious Court 
was related to Islamic economic disputes for the reason that it contained a legal defect, 
while the object of lawsuit decided by the District Court was related to the defendant‟s 
application in issuing an auction order upon the collateral of the plaintiffs. Since the 
object lawsuit was different, there was no reason for the Religious Court to reject the 
case. With regard to the decision of the Civil Court above, the Religious Court should not 
have intervened and re-examined it again because it would have contravened the 
principle of nebis in idem.  
 
The judges further found that the two murabahah contracts carried out by the plaintiffs 
and defendant were invalid because of the absence of goods. The existence of goods is 
compulsory in a murabahah contract; it is in line with the fatwa of NSC-MUI No. 
04/DSN-MUI/IV/2000 concerning Murabahah. Because the murabahah contract 
procedure was null and void, the money provided by the defendant to the plaintiffs 
should be considered as al-qard and the plaintiffs became the borrower. In Islam a lender 
is strongly prohibited from placing any additional charge on the borrower since it is 
considered as ribÉ. Allah S.W.T says in Surah al-BaqÉrah verse 275: “But God hath 
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permitted trade and forbidden usury”. Furthermore fiqh norm also says that “any debt that 
brings benefit to a lender or creditor is ribÉ”.  
 
By virtue of the above considerations, the panel judges decided inter alia:
31
 
1. Accepted the suit of the plaintiff. 
 
2. Declared that the murabahah contract conducted by the plaintiffs and defendant 
was null and void according to law.  
 
3. Declared that the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant was a 
money borrowing relationship according to al-qard contract in Islam.  
 
Despite the decisions of the panel judges above, both the plaintiffs and defendant were 
not satisfied. They therefore appealed to the Religious High Court concurrently with case 
registration No: 32 and 33/Pdt.G/2007/PTA.Pdg. In this appeal, the defendant through its 
lawyers propounded similar exceptions submitted at the Religious Court dated December 
13, 2006. Those exceptions were:  
 
1. That the principal case filed by the plaintiffs was decided by the Bukittinggi 
District Court with case Number:08/Pdt.BTH/2004/PN.BT on December 24, 
2004; 
 
2. That the objects of the case were a piece of land and building on which a 
certificate of property No. 311/Village Belakang Balok was auctioned based on 
Memory of Auction No:161/2006 on Augustus 16, 2006.  
 
The panel judges of the Religious High Court were of the opinion that the above 
exceptions can be accepted. They disagreed with the decisions of the panel judges of the 
Religious Court in the first instance. They considered that since both the customer 
(debtor) and bank have mutually agreed to conduct murabahah contract with all its 
conditions, thus such agreement shall be in effect as Nash SharÊÑah for those who made 
and must be obeyed.  It is in line with Surah Al-Maidah ayat 1: “O ye believe! Fulfill 
(all) obligations”. Furthermore, in section 17 of the two murabahah contracts mentioned 
that all legal consequences happened in it should be referred to the Indonesia Muamalat 
Arbitration Body (BAMUI). Therefore, in accordance with such contract, a body which is 
entitled to settle this dispute is a BAMUI, not a Religious Court. In addition, the 
Religious Court should declare itself as having no authority to settle such a case since 
such agreement was made before the enforcement of Law No. 3 of 2006.
32
 
 
By virtue of the above considerations, the panel judges of the Religious High Court 
considered that the decisions by the Religious Court in the first instance were 
indefensible and must be cancelled. Therefore, they decided to reject a lawsuit of the 
plaintiffs and accepted the appeal of the defendant (PT. Bank Bukopin Shari‟ah) and 
cancelled the decisions of the Bukittingi Religious Court No. 284/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Bkt. 
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The panel judges of the High Religious Court decided that “the Religious Court in the 
first instance did not have authority to decide this case”.   
 
The plaintiffs challenged and then appealed the decision of the High Religious Court by 
mean of cassation to the Supreme Court with case registration No: 292/K/AG/2008. The 
plaintiffs submitted a number of legal grounds stated in their cassation memory (memori 
kasasi) to dispute the decision of the High Religious Court inter alia, as follows: 1) The 
High Religious Court was wrong in implementing the law because besides receiving the 
defendant‟s exception, it also examined or gave consideration to the case principle, 
therefore it appeared inconsistent, 2) Based on sections 1320 and 1335 of the Civil Code, 
the murabahah contract No. 2 dated July 2, 2003 and the murabahah contract No. 43 
dated August 27, 2003 were null and void because they were made with false or 
dishonest cause. In addition, they were also contrary to the principles of a murabahah 
contract where the goods that are bought and sold must exist and belong to the creditor or 
bank, and 3) The panel judges of the Religious High Court, in their consideration, 
mentioned that the agreement conducted by the plaintiffs and defendant in this case was 
made prior to the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2006; therefore the Religious Court should 
declare it incompetent to settle such case.  
 
The Supreme Court had overruled the defendant‟s cassation. It was of the opinion that the 
above reasons cannot be justified. Those reasons were related to the appraisal of result 
verification which was regarded as the appreciation of a reality which cannot be 
considered in the examination on cassation level. The Supreme Court can overrule a 
lower court‟s decision if it in question lacked jurisdiction or acted beyond its jurisdiction; 
it applied law incorrectly or violated prevailing law and neglected to satisfy certain 
requirements imposed by law. These requirements are stipulated in section 30 of Law No. 
14 of 1985 as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004.
33
 However, the Supreme Court was 
further argue that the injunction of the High Religious Court must still be corrected based 
on the following considerations: 1) Since the case subject matter was auctioned by the 
Office of Government Credit Service and Auction (Kantor Pelayanan Piutang dan 
Lelang Negara - KP2LN) of Bukittingi  according to the Minutes of Auction (Risalah 
Lelang) No. 161/2006 dated August 16, 2006 based on the instruction of the Head of 
District Court of Bukittinggi with Determination No: 03/PDT.EKS/2006/PN.B dated July 
4, 2006, the lawsuit of the plaintiffs should be affirmed unacceptable, and 2) The lawsuit 
of the plaintiffs was affirmed unacceptable because their case had been settled by the 
District Court of Bukittingi, not because of the principle of retroactivity. Based on these 
considerations, the Supreme Court then decided to reject the cassation of the plaintiffs.
34
  
 
The plaintiffs tried again to challenge the decision of the Supreme Court on cassation by 
means of a case review (peninjauan kembali) in the Supreme Court itself with case 
registration No. 48 PK.AG.2009. However, in this last remedy, the plaintiffs‟ application 
for a case review was also overruled by the Supreme Court because the plaintiff‟s reasons 
did not comply with one of the requirements for the application of a case review, for 
instance new evidence discovered after the cassation was decided (novum) or deliberate 
mistakes performed by the panel of judges at the cassation level, as defined in section 67 
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(a to f) of Law No. 14 of 1985 as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009 
concerning the Second Amendment of Law No. 14 of 1985,
35
 and moreover there was no 
real mistake of judex juris or judex facti.
36
 
 
The above case is very interesting. It, at least, contains two important issues which can be 
taken as a valuable lesson. The first issue is the validity of the murabahah contract, 
whether it was implemented properly in accordance with Islamic principles. Although the 
High Religious Court overruled the decision of the Religious Court in the first instance 
which stipulated that the murabahah contract conducted by the plaintiffs and defendant 
was null and void, its decision may be considered a correct decision because it gave more 
focus to the enforcement of the material law rather than the enforcement of the 
procedural law. However, the High Religious Court had a different view. It focused more 
on the implementation of the procedural law rather than on the material law. 
Consequently, the High Religious Court rejected the decision of the Religious Court 
because its decision was contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity. Thus it should 
have refused to examine the case, not otherwise.  
 
The second issue is pertaining to the competency of resolving Islamic banking disputes. 
Which institution really has the absolute competency in the resolution of such disputes: 
Religious Court or Civil Court? As explained above, this case was decided by Bukittingi 
District Court, but along with the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2006 which gives power to 
the Religious Court in settling Islamic economic disputes including Islamic banking 
dispute, the plaintiffs perceived it as a another chance to take the case again to the 
Religious Court with a different subject matter. The Religious Court accepted the case 
and said that it had jurisdiction to examine the case. However, according to the High 
Religious Court, the Religious Court did not have competency to settle such dispute 
because, as agreed by the disputing parties in the agreement of the murabahah contract, if 
dispute occurs between them, such dispute will be settled by BAMUI (Indonesian 
MuÑÉmalat Arbitration Body). It is in line with Law No. 30 of 1999 concerning 
Arbitration and Alternative Dispute resolution.
37
 Supposedly, this provision should not 
only be applied to the Religious Court, but also be applied to the District Court of 
Bukittinggi. 
 
By virtue of the above case, conflict of jurisdiction may also take place when Religious 
Court and Civil Court are given similar competency in the resolution of Islamic banking 
disputes. The irresponsible parties may use this opportunity to bring the case from one 
court to another. It is important to note that the resolution of Islamic banking disputes 
with protracted manner is unfavorable to the development of Islamic banking in the 
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future. In order to create a legal certainty in dispute resolution, section 55 (2) of Law No. 
21 of 2008 concerning Islamic Banking must be deleted and stipulated that the Religious 
Court is the only court that has jurisdiction in the resolution of Islamic banking dispute.  
 
 
Case 2: PT. BPR Syariah Buana Mitra v. Herman Rasno Wibowo bin Sodirin and Harni 
binti H. Ahmad Sudarmo 
 
Another case occurred in the Religious Court of Purbalingga with case registration No. 
1047/Pdt.G/2006/PA.Pbg concerning musyarakah financing between PT. BPR Syariah 
Buana Mitra v. Herman Rasno Wibowo bin Sodirin and Harni binti H. Ahmad Sudarmo, 
both as the plaintiff and defendants respectively. In this case, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit 
against the defendants to the Religious Court of Purbalingga because the defendants had 
breached the agreement of musyarakah. Based on the contract No. 123/MSA/VII/2005 
conducted on July 20, 2005 the plaintiff agreed to give a capital to the defendants‟ 
business of brown sugar and grocery (kelontong) to the amount of Rp30.000.000. But the 
defendants were dishonest, using that capital to another business without the plaintiff‟s 
permission. Consequently, the plaintiff suffered a loss. The plaintiff wanted to withdraw 
its money, but the defendants refused to do so. It then filed a lawsuit to the Purbalingga 
Religious Court, asking it to issue an order which required defendants to return the 
money. If they failed to do so, the court was also asked to issue an order to conduct a 
seizure upon the defendants‟ collateral and auction it off.   
 
Based on the above application, the court then called defendants to come to court. 
Unfortunately they did not come even though had been called several times. As a result, 
the panel judges decided the case by verstek vonnis (judgment in absentia), accepting 
some of the plaintiff‟s request and rejecting others.  
 
The judges, in their legal considerations,
38
 were of the opinion that the defendants were in 
default where they had deliberately used the capital from the plaintiff not in accordance 
with the agreement of Musyarakah Financing No: 123/MSA/VII/2005. The defendants 
also did not have good faith to settle their obligations. The panel judges referred to the 
opinion of Prof. Dr. Subekti SH who said that, “a debtor can be considered in 
default/negligent if cannot fulfill his obligation or delayed to fulfill it or fulfilled it but 
not in accordance with the previous agreement”.   
 
In addition, the plaintiff in its application letter only requests its money to be return by 
the defendants, but it did not request to cancel the musyarakah contract.  According to 
panel judges, in an early step the plaintiff should ask to cancel the contract first which 
then was followed by the repayment request. The judges understood this because of the 
lack of understanding of the plaintiff. The panel judges referred to the Wahbah Zuhaili‟s 
opinion in his book entitled Al-Fiqhul Al Islami Waadillatuhu Juz IV P. 277, which 
explains that the contract agreement which is not applied (liÑadami tanfÊd) or its 
implementation diverted from one business to another (aw intiqÉluhu min harfatan ila 
harfatin), as in this case, such contract can be cancelled (fasakh) and with the 
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cancellation of the contract, it has ended. This argument was also referred to al-QurÉn 
Surah al-MÉidah ayat (1) which says: 
 
“O, you who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations.  
 
And also hadith of the Prophet Muhammad S.A.W: 
 
“The Muslims are bound to the contract agreement they made” (HR. Abu Dawud, 
Ahmad, Tirmidzi and Daruqutni) 
 
By virtue of the above considerations, the panel judges then decided among others: 1) 
Declared that the defendants had made a default, 2) Cancelled the contract of 
Musyarakah Financing No: 123/MSA/VII/05, dated July 20, 2005.
39
 This decision then 
was informed to the defendants on January 31, 2007.     
 
However, on September 5, 2009 the defendants through their proxy filed a Case Review 
(peninjauan kembali) to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Purbalingga 
Religious Court. The main reason presented by the defendants was that according to 
section 12 of Contract Agreement of Musyarakah Financing No: 123/MSA/VII/05 dated 
July 20, 2005 it was clearly stipulated that if there was a dispute between the plaintiff and 
defendants, such a dispute should be brought to the Syari‟ah Arbitration Body in Jakarta 
or the District Court of Purbalingga or/and Affairs Committee of State Receivable 
(Panitia Urusan Piutang Negara/PUPLN) / Office of Government Credit Service and 
Auction (Kantor Pelayanan Piutang dan Lelang Negara - KP2LN) in Semarang and not 
the Purbalingga Religious Court. In addition, unfortunately, that agreement was not 
shown at all by the plaintiff in court proceedings, thus it can be categorized as new 
evidence (novum). Hence, based on these reasons, it was evident that the Purbalingga 
Religious Court did not have authority to resolve the dispute.
40
    
 
After examining the above reasons, the Supreme Court argued that those reasons cannot 
be justified because according to section 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006 the Religious Court 
has competency to resolve Islamic economic disputes including Islamic banking disputes. 
In addition, those reasons did not include one of the reasons for the application of Case 
Review as referred to in section 67 a – f of Law No. 14 of 1985 as amended by Law 5 of 
2004 and the Second Amendment by Law No. 3 of 2009. For that reason, the Supreme 
Court decided to overrule the application of the Case Review of the defendants.
41
 
 
The above case is similar to the first case related to which institution was competent to 
resolve Islamic banking disputes. In the former case, the High Religious Court of Padang 
had overruled decision of the Religious Court of Bukittinggi since in was clearly 
mentioned in murabahah contract the disputing parties agreed to settle their dispute at 
BAMUI (Indonesian Muamalat Arbitration Body). Therefore the High Religious Court 
decided that the Religious Court had no authority to resolve the dispute. The Supreme 
Court also agreed with such decision. However, in the latter case, the Supreme Court 
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decided that the Purbalingga Religious Court has the right to settle a dispute, while it 
rejected a request of defendants‟ Case Review even if in contract has clearly pointed out 
that the disputing parties agreed to settle their dispute through Islamic arbitration in 
Jakarta (BAMUI / BASYARNAS). If we see carefully, the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the above two cases was inconsistently. Supposedly, in the latter case, the 
Supreme Court should also consider defendants‟ reason and decide that the Religious 
Court of Purbalingga had no authority to settle the dispute because incompliance with 
sections 3 and 11 (1 & 2) of Law No. 30 of 1999 concerning Arbitration and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution which stipulates that if there is an arbitration clause in the agreement 
agreed by the disputing parties, the District Courts or Religious Court does not have the 
authority to resolve such dispute.  
 
Therefore it is important to note that in order to avoid a conflict of law and competency 
as well as to ensure whether the Religious Court in the first instance has competence to 
examine the Islamic banking case; it is required to verify all documents of disputing 
parties. If an arbitration clause is found in the contract of disputing parties, it should deny 
the examination of the case.   
 
 
5.2. The Performance of BASYARNAS 
 
With the rapid development of Islamic banking and finance, BASYARNAS, as a 
recognized Islamic arbitration body in Indonesia, is playing an important role in the 
resolution of Islamic banking and finance disputes. From its establishment in 1993 until 
2010, only 18 cases have been resolved by this body. All of these cases are related to 
BBA (Al-Bai BithÉman Ójil) and murabahah financing except one case which was 
related to a claim in Islamic insurance.
42
 On the basis of the small number of cases 
resolved by the BASYARNAS it should not be perceived that it is unpopular among 
Islamic banks or the takaful industry and their customers. This situation should be seen in 
a positive perspective as many cases are apparently settled internally within such 
institutions.
43
 
 
BASYARNAS, does not start acting on its own, but waits of a complaint to be made. 
Thus it starts working when it receives a request from a disputing party. The proceedings 
are conducted in a confidential manner which is in line with the Islamic teachings where 
Muslims are enjoined to cover up a fault of others. Mostly disputes are resolved in 
amicable manner, satisfactorily and take no more than six months.
44
 However, although 
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the decisions of BASYARNAS are final and binding, there are two cases which brought 
to the court after one of the disputing parties refused to follow BASYARNAS‟ decision. 
These two cases are PT. Dana Pensiunan Angkasa Pura II v Bank Syariah Mandiri
45
 and 
PT. Atrium Masta Sakti v PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri.
46
  It is noteworthy that the 
arbitrators utilized Islamic principles as the main source in resolving the dispute.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the central office of BASYARNAS is located in Jakarta. 
Unfortunately, the office is small and consists of only one room for arbitration sessions. It 
has only a few members of staff who appear to be busy with other activities. Similar is 
the case of the arbitrators.
47
 This is because all of them work on voluntarily basis and are 
not paid any salary. Arbitrators are paid when they conduct arbitration.   
 
In order to improve the performance of BASYARNAS and to increase the confidence 
and trust of the parties, it is suggested that it must have its own building which is separate 
from MUI‟s building48 and must be equipped with good infrastructure such as separate 
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rooms for staff and arbitrators as well as for holding mediation and arbitration sessions. It 
must also be managed professionally by qualified staff and arbitrators who are available 
at all times in the secretariat. Their salary must also be given appropriately in accordance 
with their respective tasks and duties. In the globalized era, Internet is very important as a 
means of information and communication. Therefore, it should have internet connectivity 
which provides all information related to all its activities. On top of that, full support 
from the Government is necessary, so it can work effectively and efficiently.              
 
Currently, BASYARNAS has 15 branches spread in several provinces such as Riau, 
Yogyakarta, East Java, Lampung, West Kalimantan, Cirebon city, South Sulawesi, South 
Sumatra, Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Sumatra, 
Bengkulu and Banten.
49
 The effort to set up a branch of BASYARNAS in all provinces 
continues to be done. It is hoped that such effort can be materialized as soon as possible.  
 
Based on the explanation above, we can see that BASYARNAS provides significant 
support to the development of Islamic bank and finance industry by helping to solve their 
disputes in an amicable, fair, uncomplicated, and quick manner.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
For financial institutions which are based on Islamic principles, entire activities of 
Islamic banking and finance must be in compliance with such principles. In line with this, 
an important point to be taken into consideration is the use of dispute resolution. Both the 
court institution and alternative forum such as arbitration and mediation are strongly 
required to utilize Islamic principles as the primary rule in the resolution of Islamic 
banking and finance disputes. The utilization of these principles is necessary. However, 
based on experience it is found that the courts do not refer to Islamic principles in the 
resolution of Islamic banking and finance disputes. Instead, they utilize other laws. 
Consequently, the decisions given by them are not in compliance with sharÊÑah 
principles.  
 
In Indonesia, since Law No. 7 of 1989 was amended by Law No. 3 of 2006 concerning 
Religious Court, the settlement of Islamic banking and takaful as well as other Islamic 
financial institutions comes under the jurisdiction of the Religious Court. It is re-
emphasized in section 55 (1) of Law No. 21 of 2008. Giving the authority to resolve 
Islamic banking and finance disputes to the Religious Court is an appropriate step 
because by doing so the cases of Islamic banking and finance can be decided in 
compliance with Islamic law. But serious problems appear when section 55 (2) of this 
law stipulates that the disputing parties, by virtue of their mutual agreement, are allowed 
to choose Civil Court for settlement of their disputes. This step is retrogressive step, 
because when two different courts of different competency are given the authority of 
resolving a particular dispute it will certainly lead to confusion and ambiguity. Their 
jurisdiction must be properly spelled out. In addition, section 55 (2) of Law No. 21 of 
 
Achyar, the arbitrator of BASYARNAS and also a Senior Partner in Ihza & Ihza Law Firm, Jakarta, April 
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2008 is also contrary to section 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006 which earlier had stipulated an 
absolute jurisdiction of the Religious Court in the resolution of Islamic banking and 
finance disputes. In relation to this, the Government itself has showed its inconsistency in 
making the law and is still influenced by the old mindset by seeing that the purpose of the 
Religious Court is just to resolve marriage and divorce disputes only not Islamic banking 
and finance disputes. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the provision of No. 55 
(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008 must be deleted.  
 
In order to provide an alternative out-of court dispute mechanism in the resolution of 
Islamic banking, takaful and other Islamic institutional disputes in Indonesia, 
BASYARNAS was established. The main reason for the establishment of this Islamic 
arbitration was that at this early stage of the development of Islamic banking and finance, 
none of the existing courts were considered competent to resolve Islamic banking and 
finance disputes. With the establishment of Islamic arbitration, it is expected that such 
disputes can be resolved on the basis of Islamic principles.  
 
Since it commenced operations in 1993, not many cases have come to it, but this does not 
mean that it is not viable and workable or is unable to resolve disputes quickly, 
informally and satisfactorily.  
 
As the only recognized Islamic arbitration in settling disputes in respect to Islamic 
business, it plays an important role and has a very good prospect in the future. Therefore, 
it should be managed professionally by professional staff with first-rate remuneration. It 
must have its own building with good facilities such as proper rooms for holding 
arbitration proceedings, rooms for staff and arbitrators, proper library and supporting 
infrastructure. Bank Indonesia must give its full support to BASYARNAS. 
